IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MISSOULA

Cause No. 5959n

UNIVERSITY TEACHERS UNION (CTU), Local 119, MONTANA PEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AMERICAN PEDERATION OF TRACHERS, APL-CIO,

Plaintiffs.

WAY.

BOBERT BANAUGH, WALTER J. DUILGGS, and SAHAL DIESI,

Defendants.

RUB FEB 5 1996 BONNIN J. HERRI, Clark

Deputy

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By ..

APPENTS

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

- (1) That the Plaintiff is entitled to Judgment against the Defendants in an amount equal to all of the UTH equivalent feam which the Defendants have accrued under the collective bergaining agreement between the DTU and the Montana University system, plus projudgment interest of six percent and plus the costs of the suit. Therefore:
  - (A) Judgment is entered against the Defendant Robert Banaugh in favor of the Plaintiff UTV in the amount of \$661.66, plus prejudgment interest of six percent running on the 1981-1984 fees of \$288.96 from May 8, 1984 to the date of entry of judgment and prejudgment interest of six percent running on the 1984-1985 four of \$372.70 from October 31, 1984 to the date of entry of judgment, plus one-third of Plaintiff's costs.
  - (b) Judgment is entered against Defendant Walter J. Briggs. in the amount of \$164.72, plus prejudgment intorest of six percent running from May 8, 1984 until the date of entry of judgment, plus one-third of the Plaintiff's coses,

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2 THE STATE OF MONTANA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MISSOULA 3 MM 007241985 Cause No. 59590/35 BONNIE J. Million. Charle 4 Ey Carla E. Rosmin UNIVERSITY TRACHERS UNION (UTU). Local 119, MONTANA FEDERATION 5 OF TEACHERS, AMERICAN FEDERATION 6 OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, 7 Plaintiffs, OPINION. 8 AND 997 OHDER. ROBERT HANAUGH, WALTER J. 9 BRIGGS, and BAMAL DHESI, 10 Defendants: 11 12 The matters presently before the Court are the above-named 13 parties' Motions for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's action against 14 Defendants, and on Defendant briggs' Counterclaim against Plaintiff 15 in the form of judicial review, 16 The various issues presented by this case can be condensed 17. to three (3), which are: 18: Whether Section 3.288 of the subject Collective 19 Bargaining Agreement (CBA) is legally enforcemble against Defendants: 20. (2) Whether, addressing Defendant Briggs' Counterclain, the Department of Labor and Industry's Board of Personnel Appeals erred as a natter of law in dismissing Brigg's unfair labor practice (ULP) charge against Plaintiff; 21 22 and 23 (3) Whether under the CDA, Plaintiff is entitled to the 24 remady of specific performance and to recover attorney's fees if successful in its present motion. 25 The Court will treat each issue in the order listed, 26 For the reasons below-enumerated, this Court holds in favor 27 of Plaintiff on its Motion for Summary Judgment, and against Defendant 28 29 Briggs on the Counterclaim for judicial review. The essential facts are not in dispute. Defendants are members 30 the subject collective bargaining unit, although not members 31 of Plaintiff Union (UTU). UTU negotiated and obtained a collective 32

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effective July 1, 1983, through June 30, 1987. Included in the CBA is Section 3,200, or the "union security" clause, which states in pertinent part:

# "Section 3.200 Union Security

During the term of this agreement members of the bargaining unit shall either become members of the UTU or pay equivalent fees determined by the UTU as set forh below.

Employees in the bargaining unit may sign a statement provided by the UTV stating their objection in principle to becoming a member of the UTV or financially supporting the UTV and elect to contribute an equivalent amount to one or more charitable organizations authorized by the UTV.

\* \* \* \* \*

In no event shall failure to pay the obligations result in termination of employment or otherwise affect the terms and conditions of employment of any employed in the bargaining unit. Any employee in the bargaining unit who fails to pay the authorized obligation shall be subject to the following:

- Step I. A joint conference with a representative from the union and a representative of the administration at which the duties and obligations of the employee are explained to him/her.
- Step 2. Civil action by the UTU for damages against the employee.

Section 3,200, pp. 8-11, CBA, Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" (emphasis added).

Befandants here claim that Section 3.208 of the CBA, the "union security" clause, is unenforceable against them because Plaintiff (UTU) had no authority to bind members of the bargaining unit on that section as it "does not 'affect any terms or conditions of employment'." (Defendants' Memorandom in Support of Defendants' and Counterclaiment's Motion for Summary Judgment, et p. 4). That is, Defendants argue, Section 3.206, by its own terms, is not a term or condition of employment and therefore is not a topic upon which the bargaining agent (UTU) had authority to bind the principal (Defendants' Memorandom, at p. 6). This Court disagrees.

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we exceed builderning which theoreton 3'100' Recognition, CBA at pp. 7-0), possesses authority to bargain upon 2 "terms and conditions of employment," 3. M.L.R.H. V. Allis-Chalmage Manufacturing Company, 300 U.S. 175, 189 (1977). The Defendants, 4 as members of the collective bargaining unit, are bound by the CBA, 5 regardless whather or not they are members of the union. Steele 6 v. Louisville and N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Section 3.200 is clearly a "condition" or "obligation" of employment. See, San Lorenzo Educ. Asa'n v. Wilson et al., 32 Cal. 3d 841, 654 P.2d 202, 206 (1983); Bastern Michigan University v. Morgan, 100 Mich.App. 219, 298 N.W.2d 886, 889-90 (1980). The Montana Collective Bargaining for Public Employees Act (MCBPEA) specifically authorizes such union security clauses by stating, in pertinent parts: \*39-31-401 Unfair labor practices of public employer; it is an unfair labor practice for a public employer to: (3) discriminate in regard to hird or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment in order to encourage or discourage mambership in any labor organization; however, nothing in this chapter or in any other statute of this state precludes a public employer from making an Agreement with an exclusive representative to require, as a condition of suployment, that an employee who is not or does not become a union member, must have an amount equal to the union initiation fee and nonthly does deducted from his wages in the same manner as checkoff of union dues;" Section 39-31-401(3), M.C.A. (emphasis added). This statute clearly demonstrates that in Montana, such "union security" clauses or devices are, as a matter of law, enforceable conditions of employment. In approaching the second issue, namely Defendant Briggs' Counterclain for judicial review, this Court has reviewed Administrative Record (A.R.) appended to the present Court record. On Movember 30, 1983, Defendant Briggs filed on Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) charge with the Department of Labor and Industry's Board of Personnel Appeals wherein he avers: 111

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unfair labor practices pursuant to Mont, Code Ann. § 39-32-402(1), (2) (1903), in that it restrained and coerced employees in the exercise of their quaranteed rights and reacher a curon (cro), nos undaded in 2 3 that it did not in good faith represent the interests of the members of the bargaining unit during collective 4 bargaining. In addition, the UTD breached its duty, pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 5 39-31-205 (1983), to represent the interests of all the employees in the bargaining unit 5 without discrimination. 6 Statement of the Charges (attached to ULP Charge, A.R.) 7Board of Personnel Appeals Administrator Robert M. Jenson 8 dismissed Briggs' OLP claim, stating in portinent part: 99 "No investigation of the ULP charges is necessary because 10 the charges fall to allege facts which constitute a violation of the Act [MCBPSA]. Without an alleged violation of the Act, this Board does not have jurisdiction." 11 12 13. Administrator's Order of Dismissal, at p. 5 (A.R.) Briggs filed 14 timely exceptions to the Order of Dismissal on Pabruary 28, 1984, 15 and Oral Argument was scheduled before the full Board on April 27, 16. 19847 17 On May 22, 1984, after reviewing the record and considering the briefs and oral argument before it, the Board found as follows: 18 "1. That even if all the facts contained in the charge 19 are true, no known unfair labor practice has been alleged; 20. 2. That the Board believes it has no subject matter 21 jurisdiction over the allegations; 22 It is ordered that the Complainant's Exception to the Order of Dismissal are hereby denied; and 23 It is ordered that this hoard therefore adopts the 24 Administrator's Order of Dismissal as the Final Order of this Board." 25 Board of Personnel Appeals Final Order (A.R.) This Court in its 26 research has found not one Hontana or fedoral case, nor have 27 Defendants provided or cited any, that would support Defendants' 28 averrance that the Board erred as a matter of law in dismissing 29 Briggs' ULP charge. The Board's May 22, 1984, Order is hereby 30 affirmed as final on the issues presented to and decided by it. 31 The third and last issue consists of two components: whether

by the terms of the CRA, is entitled to an award of attorney's fees in the present act.

Section 3.200 of the CBA provides that bargaining unit members who fail to pay the authorized obligation shall be subject to "(c)ivil action by the UTU for damages against the employee." Section 3.200, CBA, at p. 10. Section 27-1-411, M.C.A., provides in relevant part that:

\*Specific performance of an obligation may be compelled when:

(3) it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the actual damage caused by the nonperformance of the act to be done;

In the case at bar, the actual damage caused by Defendants' refunal to pay union fees or an equivalent amount as specified in Section 1.200 (CBA) is possible to liquidate, contrary to Plaintiff's contention (Plaintiff's Reply Brief in support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, at p. 7). Rather, the amount due to Plaintiff would presumably be those fees outstanding and due as of the date of this Order. Future acts of noncompliance, in defiance of the present Order, shall be subject to sanctions and further Court order requiring payment of fees or equivalent amounts.

With regard to attorney's fees, Plaintiff asserts that Section 3.200's "civil action for damages" classe warrents this Court's award to Plaintiff of attorney's fees in this action. The Court disagrees. The CBA does not specifically state that "damages" under the language of Section 3.200 shall include attorney's fees if the UTG is successful in its civil action against a unit member who fails to pay the union fee or authorized obligation. Such language could easily have been included, but without such specific language the Court will not interfere with the plain provisions of the CBA.

See, Bastern Michigan University v. Morgan, 100 Mich.App. 219, 298 N.W.2d 686, at 891 (1980). The Court finds Plaintiff's cited cases, Emith v. Fergus County, 98 Mont. 377, 39 P.2d 191 (1934),

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Instrunce Co. v. Finski Bros., 160 Mont. 219, 500 P.2d 945 (1972) unpersuasive to its determination. Por the rationals given above, the Court bereby grants Summary Judgment in favor of UTU on its claim against Defondants Banaugh, Briggs, and Dhesi under Section 3.200 of the CBA. Correspondingly, Summary Judgment on Defendant Briggs' Counterclaim is greated in favor of Plaintiff. Pursuant to request of counsel during oral argument to reserve the question of damage, Plaintiff shall within ten (10) days of this Order submit to the Court a statement of present damages, disregarding attorney's fees. Defendants shall, within ten (10) days thereafter, submit objections, if any, to the amount of the obligations designated by Plaintiff. A hearing by this Court, if requested, may be given if discrepancies arise. If Defendants' objections are not timely made as specified above, as Order will entered in the amount designated by Plaintiff. noncompliance with the requirements of Section 3,200 shall be subject to sanctions and further court order. DATED this 2 4/ day of October, 1985. Diskrigt Judge Joan Jonkel Robert Phillips ¿ James Gardner

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STATE OF MONTANA BEFORE THE BOARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS 2 IN THE MATTER OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE NO. 16-83: 41 WALTEN J. BRIGGS. Complainant, 一定的第三元 FINAL ORDER UNIVERSITY TRACHERS UNION, UTU, MPT, APT, AFL-CIO, University of Montana, Missoula, Montana, Respondents. \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* On February 7, 1984, the Administrator issued an order dismissing these charges for the reason that they fail to allege facts constituting a violation of the Collective Bargaining Act. Exceptions to the Order of Dismissal word filed by Complainant's Attorney on Pebruary 28, 1984. Oral argument was scheduled before the Board of Personnel Appeals on April 27, 1984. After reviewing the record and considering the briefs and oral arguments, the Board Finds and Orders as follows: 1. That even if all the facts contained in the charge are true, no known unfair labor practice has been alleged. 2. That the Board believes it has no subject matter jurisdiction over the allegations. 1. It is Ordered that the Complainant's Exceptions to the Order of Dismissal are hereby denied. 4. It is Ordered that this Board therefore adopts the Administrator's Order of Dismissal as the Pinal Order of this Board? DATED this 22nd day of May, 1984. BOARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS

> Alan L. Joseelyn Chairman

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STATE OF MONTANA BEFORE THE BOARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS

IN THE MATTER OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE NO. 16-83:

WALTER J. BRIGGS,

Complainant,

omplainant,

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ORDER OF DISMISSAL

UNIVERSITY TEACHERS'UNION (UTU), MFT, AFT, AFE-CIO, UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA, MISSOULA,

Defendant.

\* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \*

On November 30, 1983, Walter J. Briggs through his attorney Robert J. Phillips, filed this unfair labor practice charge against the University Teachers Union. On December 15, 1983, the UTU filed an Answer, a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion to Strike, and Brief in Support. On January 16, 1984, attorney Phillips filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motions of Respondent. The UTU filed a Reply Memorandum on January 27, 1984.

The UTU's Brief in Support makes two requests. First, the UTU esks this Board to "strike" the charge because the charge allegedly does not contain "a clear and concise statement of facts constituting the alleged violation" required by A.R.M. 24.26.680(3)(c). We will treat this motion as a motion for more definite statement pursuant to A.R.M. 1.3.216. The UTU's second request is a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We will treat each motion separately.

## THE MOTION FOR MORE DEPINITE STATEMENT

The UTU asserts that the ULP charge does not incorporate Briggs' Memo of 11-16-83. That is not so. The Memo was

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filed with the charge and while not specifically incorporated by reference which proper pleading dictates, it is nevertheless as "attachment" as noted by the UEF charge.

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The DTU them asserts that if the Memo is considered a part of the pleadings, it is a "shot gun" approach and still violates A.R.M. 24,26.680(3)(c). Because we grant the Motion to Dismiss, the Motion for More Definite Statement is denied.

#### THE MOTION TO DISMISS

Appeals does not have the power to provide a remedy to employees who fail to contribute or to abide by the conditions of a negatiated contract." Page 7 of UTU's brief.

The UTU goes on to assert that "in similar cases, the NLRB has held that no duty of fair representation ever attaches where the employee has not paid his dues or equivalency obligation as required by the contract. John J. Roach & Co. 96 LRRM 1281, 1283 (1972); Buckley v. AFTRA 426 (sic) 496

F.2d 305, 311 (2 Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1093

Neither of those cases stand for the proposition cited.

Neither the BPA's authority to remedy a ULP pursuant to

39-31-406 nor a Union's duty to fairly represent all bargaining unit members is vitiated by the alleged breach of contract by a bargaining unit member. Neither case cited by the UTU stands for that proposition. Furthermore, the clean hands theory is an equitable doctrine. Since the BPA's authority and the Union's duty are statutorily established, the presence of unclean hands by a complainant or a bargaining unit member in no way lessens the Board's authority to remedy a ULP or a Union's duty of fair representation.

The UTU next asserts that the UTU did not have to allow non-union members of the bargaining unit to vote on contract ratification, citing Afro-American Police League v. Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge, 553 F. Supp. 664 (111., 1982); and Goclowski v. Penn Central Transp. Co., 545 F. Supp. 227, Aff'd 707 F.2d 1401 (Pa., 1982). The UTU goes on to assert that the non-union members were nevertheless allowed to vote.

Counsel for the complainant makes several points in response. He first asserts that the BPA does not have the authority to dismiss a complaint.

A complaint which fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted does not vest this Board with authority to hear and decide the case. Therefore, this Board is free to dismiss a complaint which fails to state a claim. See also ARM 24.26,680(4).

The complainant next asserts in his Brief in Composition that the Union Security Clause "was not a proper topic for bargaining" and "the UTU had no authority to bargain on this issue." Those assertions are frivolous. It is elementary that a union security clause is a mandatory subject of bargaining. It is a contradiction in terms to assert that it is an unfair labor practice for a union to bargain about a mandatory subject of bargaining. If requested to do so, the employer was legally obligated to bargain over said topic.

The fact that the negotiated union security clause contains an enforcement mechanism different than the more common termination of the employee in no way lessens its status as a valid union security clause. If a union security clause which provides for the termination of an employee for non-payment of his/her fair share is legal, then a fortiori

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a union security clause which provides a civil action method of dues collection is also legal.

The complainant does not address the UTU's assertions that the non-union members did not even have to be allowed to vote on contract ratification.

The only remaining allegation by the complainant discussed in his brief is that,

The attachments to the complaint allege that the UTU has engaged in intentional inhibition of a discussion of the Collective Bargaining Agreement in order to coerce employees into voting in favor of the Union Security Clause. It alleges that those employees voting "no" on the agreement were harassed, all in violation of MCA 39-31-206(2).

The factual allegations underlying those assertions (found in Sections 1, A, 1 and 2 of Briggs' November 14, 1983 Memo) mention an alleged failure by the UTU to fully debate the merits of the proposed contract and an allegation that people who voted "no" on the contract received "verbal harassment" from the union.

Since the law does not require the UTU to allow nonunion members to vote on contract ratification, the above allegations do not allege either (a) a breach of the duty of fair representation or (b) a violation of 39-31-206.

For the above stated reasons, the Board takes the following actions:

- That portion of the charge alleging that the union committed an unfair labor practice by negotiating a union security clause is dismised for not alleging a violation of the Act. It fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
- That portion of the charge alleging the union violated 39-31-206 and/or committed an unfair union labor

practice in the manner in which the union handled the ratification procedure is dismissed.

No investigation of the ULF charges is necessary because the charges fail to allege facts which constitute a violation of the Act. Without an alleged violation of the Act, this Board does not have jurisdiction.

Dated this \_\_\_\_ 7 \_\_\_ day of February, 1984.

Robert R. Jensen Administrator

# NOTICE

Any party aggrieved by this Order may appeal to the full Board of Personnel Appeals by filing Exceptions to this Order setting forth the grounds alleging error. The Exceptions must be filed within 20 days from receipt of this Order. If exceptions are not filed, this Order becomes the Final Order of the Board.

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned does certify that a true and correct copy of this document was mailed to the following on the 7th day of February . 1984, postage paid and addressed as follows:

Robert J. Phillips Suite 104, Central Square 201 West Main Missoula, MT 59802

Joan Jonkel Jonkel & Kennis P.O. Box 8687 Missoula, MT 59807

Jumps Jacobson

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